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  Falguni A. Sheth
Abstract
By exploring the “Western” reception of the sari in comparison to
the hijab, I hope to illuminate the racial aesthetic that is at work
in vilifying the latter while glorifying the former. The history of
colonialism and the forced domestication of the sari help to
facilitate its reception as an acceptably “sexy” garment. By
contrast, the hijab has not been subjected to colonial
modification. It has remained unmodified, and is still experienced
as culturally, racially, and aesthetically strange by observers. In
order to explore the role that political and cultural authority plays
in shaping “acceptable” and “unacceptable” racial aesthetics as
linked to the hijab and the sari, I will explore the regulation of the
sari and explore the sartorial strategies enacted by Mohandas
Gandhi in his political resistance to British rule over India. Finally,
I will draw on the prior analysis to highlight the contrast between
the acceptability of the colonially domesticated sari in
contemporary society and the hostility that the as-yet still
undomesticated hijab incurs in contemporary society.
Key Words
colonialism, concealment, couture, domestication, Gandhi, hijab,
racial aesthetic, sari, sartorial, veil
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1. Introduction
In recent years, a number of Western nations have found
themselves in the midst of controversies about the hijab, a
practice that is engaged in by a portion of the female Muslim
population around the world. Many of the controversies have
been waged on the grounds that the veil conceals too much of
the women who wear them, or that it is oppressive in that it
requires women to conceal their sexuality and that it serves the
purpose of keeping women hidden from the larger world. In
contrast, the sari, which has been in existence for thousands of
years, has historically been viewed as immodest at its worst and
“sexy” at its best. Today, the sari conceals much more of the
body than moderate forms of the hijab, although it is considered
risqué and glamorous. Also, it is more acceptable as an exotic
form of dress than the hijab. The sari is seen as an example of
charming, quaint, or cutting-edge couture worn by Indian
peasants and transnational figures alike; whereas, at least in
much of the “Western” world, the hijab is considered strange and
worn by women under coercion from patriarchal or religious
authorities.
Although the practices may be more qualitatively than
quantitatively different, my purpose here is not to evaluate the
hijab itself but rather the range of “Western” receptions of the sari
in comparison to the hijab. By doing so, I hope to illuminate the
racial aesthetic that is at work in vilifying the latter while
glorifying the former. By the “racial aesthetic,” I refer here to
signals and messages involved in the visual, cultural, and political
reception of each practice, as expressed by those who perceive
themselves as standing apart culturally, religiously, sexually, and

geopolitically from both forms of dress.
In both practices, the racial regulation of a practice, namely the
entitlement of European/North American colonial and (post)colonial superiority to pronounce whether or how much or what
kind of concealment is acceptable, remains intact. In the
contemporary context, women from a variety of national, ethnic,
and religious backgrounds wear the sari for a range of reasons,
with the exception of religious affiliation, similar to those offered
by women who wear the hijab. The sari, though conventionally
worn by Hindu women in India, does not have an expressly
religious referent and is also worn by Muslim and Christian
women in India.
In what follows, I will explore the role that political and cultural
authority plays in shaping “acceptable” and “unacceptable” racial
aesthetics linked to the hijab and the sari. Beginning with a brief
review of the controversies over the hijab, I will then explore the
sartorial strategies enacted by Mohandas Gandhi during the
evolution of his political role in the resistance to British rule over
India in the early decades of the twentieth century. For Gandhi,
clothing played a key role in consolidating certain political
impulses and symbolizing a culturally and racially specific political
worldview that also doubled as an activist stance in anti-colonial
struggles. His sartorial interventions, as expressed through his
clothes and the khadi movement, reflected a resistance to the
encroaching hegemony of a British imperial ethos, which was
linked to Britain’s pretentions to economic, modernist and liberal
superiority. While his strategy lasted only briefly in the struggles
against British imperial presence in India, it was nevertheless a
successful moment. I will link Gandhi’s perceptive strategy to a
historical review of the evolution of the sari as part of the site of
struggles over political and cultural recognition between a local
indigenous population and the colonizing authority. Finally, I will
draw on this analysis to highlight the contrast between the
current acceptability of the colonially domesticated sari and the
hostility that the still undomesticated hijab incurs in contemporary
society.
By exploring the aesthetic status of certain kinds of couture in
terms of the history of colonialism, we are better able to see how
garments such as the sari were subject to “domestication,” which
has helped to facilitate its reception as an acceptably “sexy” and
“glamorous” garment. By contrast, the hijab has not been
subjected to colonial modification (although of late it has been
the focus of “liberal” and “feminist” interventions). It has
remained unmodified, and is still experienced as culturally, racially
—and aesthetically strange by observers.
2. The Hijab
The technical meaning of the hijab is under contestation, and can
refer to a range of practices that manifest the Qu’ran’s injunction
to observe modesty. This obligation can be expressed through the
covering of the body or through a cover or screen (such as those
of the zenana, in which women spent their days but through
which they were able to see visitors or outsiders without
themselves being seen). In contemporary usage, it refers to some
form of covering of a woman’s person, usually the hair, whether
by a loose scarf or a complete covering, leaving only the face
showing.[1] Many Muslim women do not engage in the practice of
wearing the hijab; and those who do, do so to different degrees:

from covering one’s hair loosely, or completely concealing one’s
hair or covering some portion or all of one’s face (niqab).[2]
These practices have different names, many of which indicate
veiling, shielding, or guarding.[3] Here, I shall use “hijab” as a
generic term to refer to the range of coverings that can be worn,
since that is how the term is often deployed.
Women who wear different forms of the hijab have become more
conspicuous over the last two decades, especially in the years
since the events of September 11, 2001. The “veil” is worn by
different women in markedly distinct ways. Women from a range
of geographic regions, different class backgrounds, educational
achievement, marital status, and even differing religious, social,
and political commitments have engaged in the practice (see
Figure 1).[4]

Figure 1-Two Women Wearing Hijab. Photo courtesy of Green Left
Weekly, www.greenleft.org.au.

Yet these differences have converged into a general practice that
appears to have no subtle differences and is understood primarily
as offensive, oppressive, or illiberal in Western European and
North American contexts.
It is well-known, for example, that the French response to the
hijab has been to prohibit it in public (secular) institutions on the
grounds that public expressions of religion are antithetical to
“French” secular citizenship as well as to “progressive/feminist”
culture, even though analogous symbols such as the Catholic
nun’s habit or the Sikh male’s turban have not been prohibited
except when the French state has been under duress to be
consistent.[5] Among other reasons given for the prohibition by
the French government was that they were anxious to relieve
young girls from the coercion to wear the hijab.[6] And yet, it is
less well-known, though well-documented, that women who wear
the hijab do so for a variety of reasons, ranging from family or
cultural expectations, to the intention of expressing publicly one’s
religious stance, personal preference, or political statement. Some
women also document that the decision to wear the hijab is a
trade-off in negotiations with family for greater trust and greater
social and personal autonomy.[7]
These controversies over the hijab have fascinated scholars in a
range of fields, including history, anthropology, political science,

philosophy, and cultural studies.[8] The literature has been
primarily concerned with questions of individual freedom, political
harmony, secularism, oppression, and the tensions between
religious commitments and political citizenship even as it has
explored the common themes of veiling, masking, and hiding.
Why is the hijab so markedly offensive in Western contexts? In
the context of political liberalism, it offends because its function is
to conceal—or less generously—to hide. Hiding violates a
celebrated principle of transparency which is thought to
characterize an ideal political liberalism. As I’ve written
elsewhere,
“In hiding the body and the visage of its wearer, the
veil becomes troublingly conspicuous, since one
appears to be guilty or have something to hide. In
the cultural and psychological contexts of Western
public comportment, one cloaks or masks for a
range of reasons, but very few of them have positive
connotations.” [9]
This principle extends to men as well as women. It also extends,
although not always consistently, to a “Western” liberal feminist
sexuality: to conceal one’s body is to reflect an unliberated
attitude. To wear sleeveless, strapless, tops or short shorts—on
the beach, outside of the office, in the park--is thought to indicate
a comforting unselfconsciousness of the body. But it is not the
degree of concealment alone that governs the Western
perceptions of “sexual liberation;” the location of the
concealment, its context, and the ethos of the person
(un)concealing is also salient. To unconceal one’s waist,
shoulders, cleavage, and arms is more acceptable when done by
a Western woman on a beach than at the office or when standing
in front of a classroom. And yet—at least in the late twentiethearly twenty-first century, an Indian woman who does so would
be more accepted, when wearing a sari, than a non-Indian
woman. An Indian woman wearing a sari in the classroom would
also be more accepted than a North American woman (of any
background) wearing a short skirt and halter top (in a classroom)
and revealing her cleavage, waist, and shoulders. Similarly,
concealing one’s hair is also acceptable when donning a cap as
protection from intemperate climates or in a church or
synagogue. It is less acceptable—clearly—when done by women
who appear to be Middle Eastern or Arab or Muslim, and more
acceptable when done in the context of certain religious referents.
Subscribing to these complex rules of dress suggests evidence of
a shared culture, a shared fashion-and political-context, and
perhaps also a shared rationality and, if not, then at the very
least an acquiescence to the rules of the dominant context.
The hijab and niqab are dependent neither on a fashion-specific
context nor on a shared assumption of liberal cultural values. The
hijab is perceived to violate the norms of a sexually and politically
liberated society, as well as the aesthetic norms that correspond
to such a world. Dress that shrouds tends to be taken by a liberal
and liberal feminist public as a sign of a gratuitous modesty or
external duress from illegitimate sources, even when "Western"
(or "non-Muslim" but not necessarily secular) equivalents such as
the Sikh woman’s turban (see Figure 2), the Indian woman’s
headcover (see Figures 3-5), the Orthodox Jewish woman’s wig,
the Amish woman’s scarf, the Catholic nun’s habit, or the
Nigerian woman’s headwrap perform the same function, even if

for a seemingly different purpose.

Figure 2-Sikh Women in Turbans. Photo courtesy of
RealSikhism.com.

Figure 3-Laborers outside City Palace, Jaipur, India. Photo by Falguni
A. Sheth, 2008.

Figure 4-Hindu Women outside Karni Mata Temple, Bikaner,
India.Photo by Falguni A. Sheth, 2008.

Figure 5-Laborer outside City Palace, Jaipur. Photo by Falguni A.
Sheth, 2008.

Perhaps this is because of the perception that the former dress is
worn in response to a religious imperative or the expectations of
a patriarchal system, and thus thought to control women’s
sexuality.[10] So the perception that one dresses in response to
a patriarchal or (Islamic) religious system is received with
hostility by a “liberal/feminist” audience, and the perception that
Muslim women might dress in such ways out of personal
preferences is also received with hostility on the grounds that
women who were “rational” would not select such outfits
voluntarily. As importantly, the hostility to the burqa and niqab

merge with the hostility to “Muslim” or Arab non-Western
contexts that have been harshly scrutinized for their “oppressive”
or “illiberal” tendencies, a hostility that has been conspicuously
missing from formerly colonized non-Western liberal democracies
such as India.[11]
As scholars and journalists alike have pointed out, over the last
few years many young women have begun to wear the hijab as a
public expression of piety as well as an expression of political
resistance to the Western battles against Muslim religiosity,
including the now international “war on terror.”[12] But decades
before the attempts by European states to resist the public
expressions of Muslim faith, women had begun to veil in solidarity
with other women (as during the 1970s Iranian revolution) and in
resistance to “secular” national governments (as in the 1970s
Islamic movement in Egypt).[13] In the series of battles that
have been waged over the hijab, we can find another dimension
to the public expression of the hijab and its equally forceful
counter-response by a non-Muslim public: it is yet another
example of how clothing becomes a deceptively localized medium
for much larger political battles over authority, domination, and
colonization. In this regard, it has had many notable precursors,
including those over the sari, and the khadi movement
popularized by Mohandas Gandhi.
3. Gandhi and His Chadar
Gandhi’s image as a short brown man in a dhoti and chadar (see
Figure 6)[14] leading the battle against the British administration
in India and in favor of self-rule has been ensconced in our
collective consciousness.

Figure 6-Mohandas K. Gandhi in a dhoti and chadar. Photo courtesy

of National Gandhi Museum.

While the story of Gandhi’s political entreaties to reduce India’s
dependence on foreign (British) textiles is well-known as the
khadi movement, the details of the story might be relevant here.
Gandhi began his career as a lawyer in Durban, South Africa, fully
imbued with a sense of Western couture, although it was
executed with a few stylistic changes. He appeared in court for
the first time in a suit and an “imitation Bengali” turban (see
Figures 7 and 8), and was instructed by the judge to remove the
turban.

Figure 7-Gandhi in South Africa. Photo courtesy of National Gandhi
Museum.

Figure 8-Gandhi and Kasturbai in Johannesburg, South Africa. Photo
courtesy of National Gandhi Museum.

Removing one’s headgarb, as Emma Tarlo explains, was “a
gesture of humiliation” in India; an order to do so was an insult.
Although he did remove it, he wrote about the incident, which
appears to have been in line with Gandhi’s lifelong awareness

regarding the cultural and political symbolism of clothing.[15]
Sure enough, Gandhi’s embrace of swaraj (self-rule), his
corresponding exhortation to fellow Indians to show their
patriotism and commitment to Indian self-rule by spinning and
wearing khadi (simple homespun rough cloth), was steeped in a
consciousness of clothing as a medium of political symbolism
directed in resistance to the British. The khadi movement was
spurred by the resistance to British control over the Indian
economy, including forced purchases by Indians of Britishimported cloth and other goods, especially in light of the hunger
and poverty Indians were facing. One of Gandhi’s responses was
to exhort his fellow Indians to wear locally woven cloth. This
exhortation gradually extended to his learning to spin cloth,
pressuring his wife to wear khadi, and chastising his colleagues
and neighbors for their selective wearing of khadi, for example,
during political rallies when Gandhi himself was the invited
speaker or when he was traveling through their communities. For
Gandhi, wearing khadi was not an occasional or ceremonial form
of dress but one that was to be embraced as a full-time uniform.
Wearing khadi enabled Gandhi and others to illustrate vividly their
commitment to a nationalist politics, a politics of home-rule and,
ultimately, a stance of resistance to a colonial government and
forced international trade.
Gandhi’s awareness of the political and cultural importance of
clothing was also embedded in a self- and culturally-conscious
concern about offending Hindus and Muslims with his exposed
corporeal self. In part, this self-consciousness emerged from the
clear pre-Victorian British influence over “native” couture and
culture, one which figures into other, later examples of clothing
that is politically and culturally influenced, which I will discuss
below.
Gandhi’s awareness of the symbolism of his public appearance
emerged from an intricate symbolic taxonomy of dress that had
long been embedded in the Indian context (and which, I would
argue, exists in every cultural context). What one wears, how one
wears it, in front of whom one wears it already mattered in the
Indian context before the British arrived. Here is one example,
from Travancore (Kerala), on the southwestern tip of India:
There was a highly specified code of respect and
avoidance behavior enforced by the state. Caste
status was marked by fixed distances to which a
low-caste person could approach a Brahman: the
Nadars were supposed to remain thirty-six paces
from the person of a Nambudri Brahman. They were
also prohibited from carrying umbrellas and wearing
shoes or golden ornaments. Their houses had to be
only one story high, and they could not milk cows.
Nadar women could not carry pots on their hips nor
could they cover the upper part of their bodies. Nair
women were allowed to wear a light scarf around
their shoulders, which at times would be draped over
their breasts. However, they were expected to be
bare-breasted in the presence of brahmans and
other high-status people as a sign of respect. In
addition, all castes below the rank of Nair could wear
only a single cloth of rough texture, which was worn
by both men and women and which could come no
lower than the knee nor higher than the waist."[16]

The significance of clothing was amplified in cross-cultural
contexts. Indian attire was shaped much more dramatically than
British couture, not surprisingly, reflecting the power dynamic of
a British colonial administration. Under the British administration,
“Indian” attire could become the grounds to refuse entry into
British institutions, while British attire could become the grounds
for ridicule for Indian men if worn in their communities or in the
home. In addition, certain points of “etiquette” or decency were
key factors in shaping Indian couture. For the British, the
uncovering of one’s head indoors or in private social contexts
indicated respect, whereas precisely the opposite was the case for
Indians. The same was true for one’s feet. Whereas it is
customary to be shod in Western contexts, whether in an office or
in one’s home, it is offensive if not ultimately transgressive to
wear shoes in an Indian’s home or in a temple or mosque.[17]
Under Gandhi’s leadership clothing became a signification of
political ideology and control on Gandhi’s part, as well, and one
that was often received badly, not only by the British but also by
other Indians. Indian men negotiated these intricate spaces
carefully, often revising their attire to conform to certain
European fashions while retaining certain Indian customs. In
time, as the Indian resistance to British rule became stronger,
choosing between Indian and British dress became an expression
of one’s ideological commitments, as well. Much of the records
account for the garb of Indian men, since they were in public
spaces much more frequently than were Indian women. Indian
women had fewer and narrower spaces in which to negotiate their
clothing decisions, in part of because of their “less public”
position, and because their choices would have been judged
according to different standards under patriarchy. As Tarlo points
out, women whose spouses adopted European dress styles were
less likely to do the same, since “these contravened ideas of
female modesty and respect too grossly.”[18] Nevertheless, their
outfits did change and adapt in certain ways to European
sensibilities in fabric, prints, and design. But they also became
reshaped by British and Christian sensibilities of modesty and
decency, which required recognition and conformity in order to
signify one’s acceptance of the norms of the colonial powers, and
by extension, recognition and acceptance of the colonial
government itself. A non-conformity to either European dress or
appropriate modifications of Indian dress suggested an allegiance
or preference for the familiar styles of one’s community, but it
also implied a disagreement with the “superiority” of colonial
style. In this dissent lay the threat of rejection of the authority of
colonial power.
4. The Sari
The sari is no exception to this story of colonial influence and
modification. It has been in existence throughout the known
history of the region now known as India. Sari, according to one
source, “is the [A]nglicised version of sadi which existed in Prakrit
as sadia and derives itself from the sanskrit word sati, meaning a
strip of cloth.” The use of sati (sic) has been mentioned in the
Mahabharata and can probably be traced back even farther.”[19]
Predominantly worn by women in India, the sari as a dress has
extended to Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia, and Singapore and to
the so-called “Western” world as well. It was, up until three
decades ago, a predominant form of dress for both unmarried
and married women. In England and the United States, South

and Southeast Asian women do wear the sari often for special
occasions or functions, as do distinctly non-South or Southeast
Asian women. Cherie Blair, an attorney and spouse of the former
British Prime Minister, and others, has been seen wearing the sari
as a cosmopolitan fashion statement.[20]
Like the hijab, the contexts and purposes of wearing the sari vary
by region, community, caste, class, and other factors, as well (in
contemporary times, marital status among certain classes and
castes defines when women should wear the sari). We can see a
striking example of multiple styles of the sari in a late nineteenth
century painting by Indian artist Raja Ravi Varma, entitled, The
Orchestra (late nineteenth century).[21] Still, unlike the hijab,
which has often been viewed as a fundamentally offensive
practice by pundits, scholars, and politicians in the “Western
world,” in recent decades, the sari has received little negative
attention in contemporary society. If anything, the multicultural
popular consumption of Bollywood movies and conspicuous
transition to Western films of Bollywood actresses such as
Aishwarya Rai, has rendered the sari even more of a glamorous
affair than ever before. And yet, in many ways, the function of
the sari is analogous to the practice of the hijab. I am not
necessarily discussing the concealing function here—although that
is certainly part of the story that I want to explore. Rather, at
least in the case of non-Western women who wear one or the
other of these garments, they are both conspicuous expressions
of certain cultural or religious allegiances.
The current version of the sari has been familiar in Western
(mostly British) contexts for at least 200 years. Prior to that,
women wore the sari without the petticoat and the blouse which,
depending upon how it was worn (around the waist alone) might
have left their breasts uncovered, their waists exposed, and a
semi-opaque cover over their hips, as we can see in another 19th
century painting by Varma, of two figures, Shantanu and
Matsyasughandi, from an Indian myth.[22] Still another of
Varma’s paintings, Here Comes Papa, shows a different version of
the sari, worn without blouse or petticoat.[23] Since then, it has
seen a series of changes that have rendered it more suitable to
the “Western” gaze. In its present form—a 5.5 meter by 1 meter
length of cloth worn over a long petticoat and blouse--the sari
was modified under British rule to help increase the “modesty,”
and by correlation, to “reduce” the sexual promiscuity of the
women who wore saris by fashioning various auxiliary garments
that would help conceal, veil, and shroud the bodies of these
women. Today, despite the voluminous amount of material and
the complexity of affixing it to the body, the sari is now seen as
sexy, primarily because of its exposure of the waist and the upper
back, and the subtle enhancement of the breasts through the cut
of the matching blouse often worn with it. Moreover, although it
has been questioned for its suitability in twentieth century
professional contexts, as diasporic South Asian women have
entered various internationalized and professional markets, it has
rarely seen the kind of censorship that the hijab has.
In what follows, I offer a short digression into some of the
different understandings and motives behind the sari. As Emma
Tarlo suggests, “clothing matters” significantly in the Indian
context (and many others, also). What is worn, how it is worn,
how shiny, plain, simple, complicated a particular outfit is, how
one’s outfit is adorned or augmented with jewelry, sends signals

to a receiving public about the respect that the wearer has for
others. As Tarlo points out, these signals are true for women’s
outfits—regardless of the outfit in question. However, this
explanation might suffice to show that the sari is not an incidental
garment that is thrown on casually; neither are, for that matter, a
pair of jeans and a T-shirt. Rather, both are worn to express
certain messages in a function analogous to that of the hijab. A tshirt and jeans are the expression of a certain social or material
status, a certain political privilege, and a response to certain
political, social, and cultural contexts--which can indicate a racial,
cultural, and class aesthetic. All of these sartorial forms signify or
recognize a certain authority by which to “speak” or be heard
sartorially.[24]
In part, for the sari at least, this significance emerges from
complex caste strata, read silently through outward appearances
that signify one’s social and religious status. One need only look
at length of one’s dhoti[25] or the way in which the sari is
wrapped to induce the general region, class, political position, and
relative “urbaneness” of the wearer. As Bernard Cohn suggests,
“[t]his substantial nature of authority in the Indic
world is crucial for any understanding of the
widespread significance of cloth and clothes, as they
are a medium through which substances can be
transferred. Clothes are not just body coverings and
matters of adornment, nor can they be understood
only as metaphors of power and authority, nor as
symbols; in many contexts, clothes literally are
authority. The constitution of authoritative
relationships, of rulership, or hierarchy in India
cannot be reduced to the sociological construction of
leaders and followers, patrons and clients,
subordination and superordination alone. Authority is
literally part of the body of those who possess it. It
can be transferred from person to person through
acts of incorporation, which not only create followers
or subordinates, but a body of companions of the
ruler who have shared some of his substance.”[26]
Of course these signals can be easily manipulated to send certain
signals. Indira Gandhi, when campaigning or give public
speeches, would always wear a sari in the handloom fabric of the
region in which she was speaking, in order to signify solidarity
with the local population and to popularize the fabrics that they
produced.[27] However, the relationship between garments and
a complex nexus of authority reveals an important aspect of
clothing that tends to be eclipsed in many, especially Western
contexts. If clothing signifies power, authority, or some lack
thereof, then it is also a conduit by which the authority of those
in power can be exhibited.
We see this vividly in the stories of the khadi movement and of
the exercise of power over the Nadar women in Travancore
(Kerala) under the British colonial administration. Over the course
of the nineteenth century, the British colonial authorities, working
in concert with Christian missionaries, would significantly change
the set of norms and significations surrounding the sari.
Missionaries, especially, recorded the absence of covered breasts
as a sign of sexual promiscuity and indulgence:
Hear, readers. The Shudra women of Malayalam on

attaining sexual maturity receive cloth from many
and become the wives of many, bearing many
children. Even the mother cannot know the paternity
of her many children . . . Due to such an evil
practice, there is absolutely no faithfulness between
husband and wife or love for one’s father or children
except out of the desire for material gain . . .
Women, in order to make a living, give up their
honour, and like offering bait to fish, cast off their
upper-cloth and display their breasts in order to
grab wealth.[28]
Christian missionaries and British administrators worked in
(unintentional) concert to urge Nadar women to wear longer
clothes, and for women converted to Christianity to conceal their
breasts.[29] In 1813, the British government in Kerala, working in
concert with British missionaries, “grant[ed] permission to women
converted to Christianity to cover their bosoms as obtains among
Christians in other countries.”[30] This mandate created havoc.
Because it was seen as transgressing the carefully choreographed
taxonomy of caste, purity, and pollution, the order was quickly
rescinded, “forbidding the Nadar women to wear the Nair loose
scarf, but allowing them to wear …the jacket worn by Syrian
Christians and Moplahs.” Clearly, the outcome, regardless of the
stated intention of the policy-maker was to exert some form of
control in accordance with certain urgent priorities of the policymaker. This is true not only for the Keralans but also for the
British administration and the missionaries.
The work of the missionaries was not completed. The spouses of
missionaries had created a “loose jacket that met their criteria for
modest clothing that befitted Christian women,” but Nadar women
continued to wear the breast cloth, without or without the
jacket.[31] And havoc continued: The upper castes of Kerala
punished Nadar women for wearing the breast-cloth by attacking,
stripping and beating them, and burning their chapels and
schools. And in turn, the Travancore government (1828) managed
the violence by “restating the …policy of forbidding the Nadar
women to wear the Nair-style cloth, but allowing the jacket.”[32]
It is not clear whether such choreography was ubiquitous among
all castes, but it is an example of the remarkable place that
clothing had in terms of recognizing and signifying authority.
Advancing and retreating, until the end of the nineteenth century,
the British in concert with missionaries tried to impose new
standards of “modesty” and “decency” on Keralan women. In
1858, for example, they promised to refrain from interference
with caste, and granted permission to the Keralan government to
observe caste rules by forbidding the breast cloth, only to issue a
new contradictory dictum one year later: “The government of
Madras, under pressure from missionaries in England and in India,
instructed Cullen in no uncertain terms that they were a Christian
government and ‘the whole civilized world would cry shame on us,
if we did not take a firm stand’ against the king of
Travancore.”[33] They tried to negotiate between their relations
with the raja of Kerala and their ideals of modesty, but were
alternately met by violence, resistance, and finally imposed their
will absolutely, until the “modest” version of the sari, which
concealed according to Christian and colonial standards, gained
widespread acceptance.

There are some important lessons that can be learned here. For
example, we see that the reading of the normative implications of
a garment is intrinsically linked to the racial lens through which
the population is read. In this case the reading of the sexual
mores and (un)civilized status of a group was shaped and
facilitated or diminished by the success of the emissaries of the
colonial authorities to intervene and regulate the clothing
practices of the local population. We also see that the political,
social, and cultural importance of the regulating authority is
established by the (coerced) establishment of the dress codes and
modifications of the garments or practices in question. It could be
argued that these political dynamics are in evidence in any
institutional hierarchy, as is evidenced, for example, by student
dress codes in public grammar schools, and that these dynamics
are not necessarily racial.
That is true. The racial aesthetic dimension of the clothing enters
the analysis when we read the norms of acceptable dress as they
are applied to stylized production of the “good” savage or subhumanoid entity.[34] In order for Indian women to be viewed as
“good” women, at least sartorially, their form of dress must
resonate as familiar to white women who act within the frame of
colonial authority. This requires the concealment of the breasts,
waist, backs in a mode that echoes pre-Victorian expatriate
British women’s fashions. The introduction of the long-sleeved
and long blouses and the petticoats to the sari enables the proper
colonial modification of the sari so that it passes the test of
“modest” wear, and its wearer indicates her recognition of and,
by extension, her acquiescence in the colonial authority (even if
this is done through local legislation).
As Cohn and Tarlo both point out, clothing matters and is the site
of authority and resistance to authority. As such, we can
understand not only the colonial events of the nineteenth century,
but also the ability to resist and circumvent authority through
couture via political statements such as those made by Gandhi
and by the encroaching tendencies of economic hegemony such
as those of multicultural, cosmopolitan, and global fashion trends.
In the contemporary context, the colonially-reshaped sari’s
longevity is extended through the multicultural and consumer
rubrics of “global capitalism.” Beyond the multiculturalist
appreciation fantasies that justify the consumption tendencies of
“ethnic” commodities and culture, such as Bollywood films and
“Indian” or what passes for Indian food outside of India, the
colonialist domestication of the sari renders it rife for adaptation
to a global capitalist culture. Current versions of the sari are
popularized by cross-over Bollywood actresses and by Western
notables alike; but even outside of India, ensuing generations of
diasporic South Asian women have adopted (and adapted) the
sari to express an ethnic hipness that resonates with Bollywood
and Hollywood aspirations for an “apolitical,” “cosmopolitan,” and
“ethnically chic” glamour; we see this as fashion magazines and
celebrity media cover Elizabeth Hurley in her ornate sari-like gear
on the occasion of her marriage in Texas to the Arun Nayar, son
of a famous Indian tycoon, and new chic and glossy Diasporic
Indian fashion magazines (like Bibi) promulgate new varying
styles of the sari.[35] And so in the midst of colonialism and
global capitalism, we find the sari to be no longer a source of
scandal or transgression but rather catapulted into the realm of
cutting-edge haute couture, perhaps because it has already been
vetted and shaped for a “Western” sensibility, which then opens a

space to re-shape it for sex appeal and glamor.
5. Differences and Commonalities
I now want to consider some reasons behind the markedly
different treatment between the hijab and the sari. The hijab,
unlike the sari, still has the widespread public perception of being
“strange” rather than sexy. There are several reasons that may
account for the disparity: As I explained in the last section, even
though the sari has been in existence for thousands of years, it
has been influenced significantly by British colonialism in a way
that the hijab has remarkably escaped. The hijab has not had a
chance to be domesticated by colonial powers, although there are
examples of “Westernized” forms of the veil, which appear to be
more acceptable in urbane contexts. By “domestication” of the
sari, I mean the ability to transform the sari, with its regional,
stylistic, and hierarchical signaling, into a “uniform,”
“cosmopolitan” mode of dress that indicates its appropriateness in
formal, (geographically and culturally) Western, urbane settings.
The veil has not been domesticated so as to be able to serve a
similar function, unless we count the “glamorous”
compolitanization of the hijab, as seen for example, through the
work of Myriam Abdelaziz.[36]
Moreover, whereas the sari could be compared to Western
women’s skirts and tight-bodiced jackets, the hijab has no
counterpart among Western women’s fashions, except in the case
of religious or ceremonial garb, such as the Catholic nun’s habit
or the Christian bride’s wedding veil. We do not have to work too
hard to see how and why the double standard between the habit
and the hijab would emerge. In the tradition of true fashion, the
veil appears to be more offensive, more transgressive, because it
has not received the “papal” blessing, as it were, or the kiss of
approval from a colonial, now imperial, authority. Moreover, it
does not follow a set of implicit stylized procedures about how,
where, or when to conceal or reveal, as does the sari with regard
to a stylized accentuation of a woman’s breasts, exposed waist,
and covered hips.
The tendency to cover one’s face and head through a form of veil
has for some time been a part of Hindu women’s couture. In
Gujarat and in South India, both of which have Hindu and Muslim
populations living closely together, and especially in rural regions,
veiling with the pallu (end) of one’s sari is an important signifying
function of modesty for women of all strata.
And yet during earlier moments and in places in the South and in
Gujarat, “Muslim” clothing habits in India appear to have been
understood as an imperative to conceal that is, at least by some
Hindu communities, considered antithetical to “Hindu” couturier
imperatives of purity and chastity. This idea is predicated on the
premise that covering or partially concealing oneself is a form of
sexual allure. One example comes from an anecdote of the
spouse of an early twentieth-century Keralan reformer, who
wished to integrate the blouse into her sari, enhancing her sexual
appeal, which was thought to be diminished by wearing the sari
without the blouse. Her husband approved. Her mother berated
and beat her for behaving like a “Muslim” and a promiscuous
“dancing girl.”[37] One way to read this story is to understand
that the act of covering her chest with a blouse is to become
more seductive by a form of allure through opacity, which is
associated (in the part of the region from where the story

originates) with the sexually promiscuous practices of Muslims
and not Hindus. Some aspects of the salwar kameez and the
blouse have been adopted, gradually, by Hindu communities, and
elsewhere have become standard fashion for younger and older
women in urban and rural locales. And whereas in Kerala, Muslim
women do wear saris, most wear headscarves and long loose
blouses that match their saris. In essence, the form of dress is
not by itself the sole site of controversy. Rather, the political,
geographical, social, and discursive context matters to the status
of the sartorial form.
Beyond a perceived but dubious “cultural” imperative to conceal,
another reason that the hijab escapes “Western” influence might
be because Muslim women, especially within Mughal kingdoms
under British colonial rule, remained in purdah or in a zenana,
that is, behind closed doors such that neither the colonial
administration nor Christian missionaries would have had a
chance to weigh in or opine changes to the hijab. That particular
form of purdah is changing, and might be another reason that the
hijab has gained in popularity as a portable, self-contained
purdah. While the essence of the hijab, chador, and other
variants have remained unchanged and “uncosmopolitan,” in
general, unlike the sari, the hijab itself has been adapted to
various capitalistic and cosmopolitan fashion whims, which may
be why there are more “urbane” hijab fashions in nations as
diverse as France, Egypt, and Iran, where women of different
backgrounds and strata tend to combine their expressions of piety
with their zeal for a more Westernized urbane look. The latter
trend is an interesting phenomenon that appears to be in tension
with the argument drawn here about the colonialism production
of the Westernized sari. However, I think it may be consistent
with a parallel trend of economic global colonialism to “be more
acceptable” or “to blend in” in order to avoid and appease the
more stringent elements who oppose the hijab.
But the net result has been that the hijab has become, as the sari
was under the British colonial administration, the site of struggles
for power. Through the prohibitions on the hijab in various
Western countries, along with official pronouncements of
resistance, often from imams and mullahs as well as from the
women whose persons are the center of these struggles, the
battle to control the sites of women’s bodies remains alive and
well, couched in arguments for the political liberation of women,
or an insistence for publicity and transparency, or even in
arguments for their sexual liberation, as if this were really the
concern of men in power. And because the hijab had proved itself
to be much more resistant to colonialism, Christianity, and
capitalism in the past than the sari was, it seems to make sense
that its time to be dominated, or at least to be the subject of
domination, has now emerged in contemporary times. It is
susceptible to the charges of strangeness, with all of its
insinuations of noncompliance, unwillingness, intolerance,
aloofness, and general “unneighborliness.” In the context of
Western American imperialism, “unneighborliness” is as ugly a
charge that one can be subjected to, next to being
“undemocratic,” “aggression-loving,” and “anti-capitalist,” as our
hijab-wearing sisters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, have come
to know all too well.[38]
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